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Abstract
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent
setting with asymmetric information. If the person who has the power
to act, the principal, doesn't have the necessary information to make
the best possible decision, she can address herself to someone, the
agent, who has this information. Such delegation of authority has
its drawbacks given that the agent may not implement the principal's
ideal decision. Delegation is costly for the principal. This cost is called
the loss of control. But delegation has also its bene¯ts. We show that
delegation is useful to reduce the initial asymmetry of information
between the principal and the agent. The bene¯ts of delegation are
linked to the information transmitted by the agent to the principal.
To show this, we model an organization composed of one principal and
one agent. The organization should take a sequence of decisions that
are a®ected by a common environemental parameter. We assume that
there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and
the subordinate agent: the agent knows the state of the world while
the principal has only some prior about its distribution. Moreover, we
assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques µ a la Baron
Myerson to elicit agent's superior information. In contrast, we adopt
an incomplete contract framework and posit that the decision and the
state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for. Therefore, the
remaining contracting variable is the allocation of decision rights. With
these simple contracts, we study how the agent's decision can signal his
information to the principal. When the agent is in charge of a decision,
his decision signals his information to the principal. The trade o®
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1between information transmitted through decisions under delegation
and the associated loss of control is the heart of our analysis.
1 Introduction
This paper addresses the question of delegation in a principal-agent setting
with asymmetric information. If the person who has the power to act, the
principal1, doesn't have the necessary knowledge (or information) to make
the best possible decision, she can address herself to someone, the agent,
who has this necessary information. Such delegation of authority has its
drawbacks given that the agent may not necessarily implement the princi-
pal's ideal decision. In this paper,we suppose that the agent has preferences
which are ¯xed but divergent from those of the principal. So delegation is
costly for the principal. This cost is often referred in the literature as the
loss of control. On the other hand, delegation has also its bene¯ts. In a
principal agent setting, the bene¯ts of delegation are more di±cult to iden-
tify2: for MMR, the bene¯ts of delegation (they call them °exibility gains)
are linked to the inability for the agents to communicate with the principal.
For La®ont Martimort and Felli, a three layer hierarchy is better able to
prevent collusion than a centralized structure. For Aghion and Tirole, dele-
gating authority stimulates the e®ort of the agent in information acquisition.
In this paper, we show that delegation may be useful to reduce the initial
asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent. The bene-
¯ts of delegation are linked to the information transmitted by the agent to
the principal. The central result of the paper is to show that the delegated
decisions are informative and the principal learns information when she del-
egates. To show this, we model an organization composed of one principal
and one agent. The organization should take a sequence of (two) decisions
that are a®ected by a common state of the world parameter . We assume
that there is an initial asymmetry of information between the principal and
1We will refer as 'she' for the principal and 'he' for the agent.
2In the standard principal agent theory, following the revelation principle (Myerson,
1982), delegation is always weakly dominated by a grand contract between the principal
and all the agents. To speak about delegation in a principal agent setting, one needs to
relax some assumption of the revelation principle. Melumad, Mookherjee and Reichel-
stein (1992) (herafter MMR) relax the assumption of perfect communication between the
principal and the agent, Felli relaxes the assumption of in¯nitely costly communication
between agent, in order to allow collusion. La®ont and Martimort assume that com-
munication between the principal and the agents is imperfect and that side contracting
between agents is feasible. Aghion Tirole (1997) and this paper assume that the contracts
are incomplete.
2the subordinate agent: the agent knows the state of the world parameter
while the principal has only some prior about its distribution. Moreover,
we assume that the principal cannot use revelation techniques µ a la Baron
Myerson to elicit agent's superior information. In contrast, we adopt an in-
complete contract framework (Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990), Hart (1995) and Tirole (1999)) and posit that the decision and the
state of the world parameter cannot be contracted for, neither ex ante nor
ex post. Therefore, the remaining contracting variable is the allocation of
decision rights. The only feasible contract is to decide who is in charge of
each decision. Focusing on that simple contract is a convenient way to study
how the agent's decision can signal his information to the principal. When
the agent is in charge of a decision, his decision signals the state of the world
to the principal. The trade o® between information transmitted through de-
cisions under delegation and the associated loss of control is the heart of our
analysis. The ¯rst part of the paper studies how the (equilibrium) decisions
of the agent reveals information to the principal. To show this, we use the
properties of the signalling games. We show that to reveal his information,
the agent may engage in costly signalling: i.e. take a decision which is not
is preferred one. Using appropriate equilibrium re¯nement (Cho and Kreps'
intuitive criterion) allow us to eliminate non informative equilibria. In other
words, the only equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion is the least
costly separating equilibrium (Riley equilibrium). By using the intuitive
criterion, we can say that the equilibrium described in the paper represents
the upper limit of what could be achieve under delegation. After describing
the outcomes under all the possible organizational structure3, we compute
the costs and bene¯ts associated with all the forms of delegation. We show
that the bene¯ts of delegation are linked to the asymmetry of information.
On the other hand, the costs of delegation are function of the divergence of
interests between the principal and the agent. With the help of these costs
and bene¯ts of delegation, we can compute the optimal organizational form.
We can say (roughly) that delegation is preferred when agent's information
has a great value and no delegation (a situation to which we refer as central-
ization) is preferred for large divergence of interest. We also show that the
other forms of delegation like delegation of the second decision may emerge
as the optimal organizational structure.
Another result is to show that, as the agent may not take his preferred
decision in order to signal the information he posses, not only the importance
3We distinguish three forms of delegation: delegation of the ¯rst decision only, delega-
tion of the second decision only and delegation of both decisions.
3of divergence of interest (the distance between the agent's and principal's
ideal decisions) but also its direction (whether or not the principal prefers
greater/smaller decisions than the agent) matters. To illustrate this point,
consider the following example: if the agent takes a greater than his preferred
decision under delegation in order to transmit the information he has about
the state of the world to the principal, the utility of the principal is increased
only if the principal's ideal decision is greater than those of the agent.
We believe that the trade o® between information transmission and loss
of control can be a rational for delegation in many complex organizations.
The following three examples illustrates some of the relations, we would like
to explain:
Example 1 (political decision): In the political area, decision makers
(ministers, governments, ...) especially those who are new in o±ce do not
have the necessary knowledge of the problems and environment to take the
best political decision. On the other hand, administrations, advisors and
experts generally have this knowledge but lack of decision power. One
solution for the minister is to delegate the decision to the administration.
This has harmful e®ects if the administration has objectives that are not
those of the minister (which seems to be plausible, as deciders changes while
administration remains in place). Such a delegation has two advantages:
¯rst the administration is informed about (its) best decision and secondly, if
the minister knows the administration's preference, he can learn through the
observation of the decision what are the environmental conditions and use
this information for subsequent decisions. The relations between ministers
and administrations can be explained by a trade o® between loss of control
over decisions and information transfers.
Example 2 (vertical relations): In vertical relations, the client ¯rm has to
decide whether to buy a necessary component (delegation) or to produce it
'at home'. If the external supplier has a knowledge advantage (better knowl-
edge of production process, patent, precise knowledge of cost conditions,...),
outsourcing may be the good solution for the client. But the supplier may
not act exactly in client's interests: the supplier may be reluctant to invest
in speci¯c assets (or speci¯c knowledge), he may not engage some R&D de-
sired by the client,... But outsourcing has advantages as well as costs. If the
client ¯rm buys the component, there will be a transfer of knowledge from
the supplying ¯rm to the client. This transfer is such that, after buying,
the client becomes more informed about the environment (the costs con-
ditions or the technological possibilities for example). This informational
bene¯ts may be such that, in the future, the client ¯rm decide to produce
its own component. When the client initially outsources (delegates), even
4if the supplier will not act as a subsidiary ¯rm would do, there is a transfer
of knowledge from the supplier to the client. And this information can be
used by the client for its subsequent decisions.
Example 3 (research): Many organizations such as ¯rms, governments or
international organizations delegate research to experts like consulting ¯rms
or universities while they have resources to produce it. We can explain such
a delegation by the fact that even if the consulting ¯rms and/or universities
have a di®erent objective from those of the government (for example valuable
academic research vs support to decisions) , they have a better knowledge
of the 'state of research' in some particular ¯eld. Part of this expertise is
transmitted through the research output and the deciders can use it as a
basis for their subsequent research that can be oriented more toward support
to decisions.
There are several papers related to ours. Aghion Tirole (1997, men-
tioned above), study the rational for delegation in a structure where the
asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent is endoge-
nous. They show that giving authority to the subordinate increases his
incentive to be informed, which in turn increases his e®ective control over
decisions (sometimes at the expense of the principal). The trade o® studied
by these authors is between loss of control and agent's increased initiative
under delegation. Another paper that study the rational for delegation in
an incomplete contract set up is Dessein (1999). He shows that the trade
o® between delegation and no delegation (where the agent only communi-
cates some information to the principal) is a trade o® between loss of control
and loss of information. Under delegation, the decision is based on perfect
information but take by an agent who doesn't share organization's prefer-
ences, while under no delegation, there is no bias in the decision but the
information transmitted by the agent is noisy (µ a la Crawford Sobel): the
principal doesn't learn the state of the world from the message transmitted
by the agent but only improves her priors. In Legros (1993), at each pe-
riod the principal delegates the choice of a policy to an agent with unknown
preference. While taking a decision, the delegate trades o® the immediate
gain of taking his preferred decision (or a decision close to his preferred
one) and the information about his preferences transmitted through the de-
cision to the principal. This information is important because it a®ects the
probability of being chosen as a delegate for the next period. Opposed to
this paper, Legros shows that, when there is an asymmetry of information
about preferences, the decisions cannot be completely informative and there
is some bunching between types. Armstrong (1994) studies the problem of
delegation when the principal ignores the state of the world and the agent's
5preference over decisions. His paper is not about the rational for delegation
but to describe how to reduce the agent's discretionary power ( an approach
similar to our second extension).
In the paper, we present two extensions of the model:
(i) We extend the analysis to allow for pre-play communication between
the agent and the principal. More precisely, we describe when the agent
communicates his information to the principal (not through decisions but
through messages) when she retains the decisions rights over both decisions.
We show that under some circumstances, the principal can achieve informa-
tion transmission by the agent and keep control over both decisions. The
existence of cheap talks, if it reduces the need for delegation, does not sup-
press it.
(ii) We try to see how the principal can limit the use (or abuse) of
the decision right by the agent by imposing some rules that constraint the
choice of the subordinate agent. We analyses rules that take the form
of a limitation of the agents' subset of actions. In most case, a rule is
useful tool to mitigate the losses of control but it has some limits. These
limits are the requirement that the delegated decision remains informative
(the principal should learn something by observing it) and that the rule
doesn't constraint the agent to quit the organization (he must receive at
least his reservation utility). Within these limits, we describe what is in
our framework an optimal rule. Even if the principal can restrict agent's
discretion, she cannot suppress all the costs associated with delegation.
The paper is organized as follow: in the next section, we present the
model. In section 3, we describe the equilibrium decisions under the di®er-
ent organizational forms. We look, in section 4, at the costs and bene¯ts of
delegation. The model is extend to allow for cheap talk in section 5. In sec-
tion 6, we describe how the principal may restrain the agent's discretionary
power, and how this a®ects the outcome of the game . Section 7 concludes.
2 Model
We model an organization composed of one principal and one agent. This
organization takes a sequence of two decisions (labelled d1 and d2) These
decisions a®ect the welfare of both organization's members4. The utility
of the principal and the agent are also a®ected by a common environmental
4Even if there is no dynamic in the model, we will sometimes refer to d1 as the ¯rst
period decision and d2 as the second period decision.
6parameter µ. This parameter is constant over periods5.
Contractual restrictions In this model, the only contracting variable
is the allocation of decision rights over d1 and d2. These decision rights
are allocated by the principal at the beginning of the ¯rst period either
to herself or to the agent6. These contractual restrictions are consistent
with the incomplete contract view of organizations. Giving authority to
a subordinate agent is giving the right to select a decision from an allowed
set (see Simon (1951), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990),
Aghion and Tirole (1997)).
Environmental parameter We assume that the agent knows the "state
of the world". This environmental parameter a®ects the utility of both the
principal and the agent. The state of the world is drawn out of a set £ from
a common knowledge distribution F(µ). For simplicity, we assume7 that
£=f µ 1;µ 2g, with µ1 <µ 2and we call ¢µ = µ2 ¡ µ1. The probability that
µ equals µ1 is denoted v1, the probability of µ = µ2 equals v2 =1¡v 1.
Decisions The choice of a decision represents the choice of a project im-
plemented by the organization. The projects di®ers only in one dimension.
We suppose that there is a continuum of possible decisions given by ]0;+1[:
Utility functions The utility of the agent is:
UA = ®1d1 ¡
(µ ¡ d1)2
2
+ ®2d2 ¡
(µ ¡ d2)2
2
The utility of the principal is:
UP = ¯1d1 ¡
(µ ¡ d1)2
2
+ ¯2d2 ¡
(µ ¡ d2)2
2
5This is a simpli¯cation. We can alternatively assume that the state of the world
changes over periods and that there is some correlation between the state of the world
in the two periods. In this case, the results of the paper remains qualitatively the same.
The important assumption is that the observation of the ¯rst decision (under delegation)
improves the information about the state of the world in the second period.
6The fact that the principal initially possess decision rights over both decisions can be
justi¯ed by ownership of physical assets that confers the right to decide about their use
or by institutional agreement, as it is the case in political decisions.
7The two states of the world framework simpli¯es the signalling game between, the
principal and the agent without making it trivial.
7These utility functions exhibit three characteristics: ¯rst, the divergence of
interest between the principal and the agent is measured by the di®erent
private bene¯t associated with each decision: ®idi and ¯idi, i =1 ;2. These
private bene¯ts are measured in monetary units. . Second, the cost is
state dependent and identical for the principal and the agent. The cost of
implementing a decision di in state µ is:
(µ¡di)2
2 . Third, these functions are
single peaked in each decision. The single peak assumption implies that the
utility of the agent and the principal achieves a unique maximum in each
decision for di equals to respectively ®i + µ and ¯i + µ. A high µ pushes
up the ideal point of both the principal and the agent. So the interest of the
two members are not completely antinomic.
The ratios ®1
®2 and
¯1
¯2 measure the relative importance of d1 over d2 for
the agent and the principal8
The following picture represents the utility functions of the principal and
the agent.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
Note that these utility functions satis¯es (trivially) the single crossing
property.
Agent's participation: individual rationality After learning µ and
the allocation of decision rights (the organizational form), the agent has the
possibility of quitting the organization. We assume that the agent has an
outside opportunity that gives him a utility level normalized to zero9.I f
the agent refuses to participate in the organization, it shuts down and both
the principal and the agent get a zero payo®. A simple way to force the
participation of the agent when d1 and d2 are such that UA(µ;d1;d 2)<0i st o
pay to the agent an unconditional wage W such that: UA(µ;d1;d 2)+W =0 .
In this case, only ex ante e±cient organizations: organizations such that the
total welfare (ex ante) is positive (EUP +UA ¸ 0), are carried out.
Timing of events The timing of decisions is as follow:
² The principal allocates decision rights.
² The agent observes the state of the world.
8Assuming that these ratios are di®erent from one, helps us to identify more clearly in
the analysis the in°uence of the ¯rst and the second decision.
9In the main course of this paper, we won't focus on individual rationality constraints.
The exceptions are section xx and xx where it is shown that the participation constraints
can a®ect the organizational choice.
8² The agent decides to stay within the organization or quit it.
² The ¯rst decision d1 is taken
² The second decision d2 is taken
² payo®s are collected
3 Equilibrium decisions
We assume that the only contracting variable is the allocation of decision
rights over d1 and d2. There are four possible allocations of decisions right:
centralization, delegation, complete delegation and second period delega-
tion. We call centralization the case in which the principal keeps the de-
cision rights over both decisions, delegation (or ¯rst period delegation) the
case in which the better informed agent receives the decision right over d1;
complete delegation is the allocation of both decision rights to the agent and
second period delegation is the allocation of d1 to the principal and d2 to
the agent. This section describes the outcome of the game under these four
organizational forms.
3.1 Centralization
Under centralization, the principal doesn't know the state of the world µ till
the end of the game and the realization of costs. She therefore takes what
we call "blind decisions": decisions that are not contingent on the value of
µ. These decisions are chosen in order to maximize the principal's expected
utility and are given by the following equations:
d1 = v1µ1 + v2µ2 + ¯1 = Eµ+¯1 (1)
d2 = v1µ1 + v2µ2 + ¯2 = Eµ+¯2 (2)
3.2 Delegation
When the principal delegates d1 to the agent, she observes agent's deci-
sion before choosing d2 This observation imposes a revision of her prior
believes about the distribution of the state of the world parameter µ: The
game played by the principal and the agent is a standard signalling game. A
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of this signalling game is :fd¤
1(µ1);d ¤
1(µ 2);d ¤
2(µ 1);d ¤
2(µ 2);¹(d 1)g
where ¹(d1) is the posterior distribution of µ after the principal has observed
d1. The posterior believes are computed with the Baye's rule. This kind
9of game usually has multiple equilibria10. We use the intuitive criterion
(Cho-Kreps, 1987) to screen among all the possible equilibria. The use of
the intuitive criterion can be justi¯ed by the following arguments: ¯rst, as
we want to make comparisons between delegation and the other structure,
the multiplicity of equilibria is a problem that can be solved by using this
equilibrium re¯nement. Second, among the set of separating equilibria, the
intuitive criterion selects the Pareto e±cient one. This criterion not only
get a rid of multiple equilibria but also have an e±ciency content.
Proposition 1 The only equilibrium that survives the intuitive criterion is
the least costly separating (LCS) equilibrium (Riley outcome).
This ¯rst proposition is the central result of the paper. It establishes
that using the properties of signalling games, delegation is going together
with a transfer of information from the agent to the principal. When the
contracts are incomplete, the principal can still extract information from the
agent by delegating the choice of some decision.
Corrolary 1 The LCS equilibrium is:
d2(µ)=¯ 2+µ (3)
If ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2j
d 1( µ )=® 1+µ (4)
If ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ
d1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 (5)
d1(µ2)=® 1 + µ 2 +(
p
K 1¡¢ µ)( 6 )
Where K1 =( 2 ® 2¡2 ¯ 2¡¢ µ )¢µ
If ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ
d1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 ¡ (
p
K 2 ¡ ¢ µ )( 7 )
d 1 ( µ 2 )=® 1 + µ 2 (8)
Where K2 =( 2 ¯ 2¡2 ® 2¡¢ µ )¢µ
10There are three kinds of equilibria: separating, pooling and semi pooling (or hybrid
equilibria).
10We call the ¯rst case 'free lunch' or no costs signals. We refer to the
other cases as the costly signaling cases. Now we prove proposition 1 and
its corollary.
Proof. (i) Separating equilibria: The set of separating equilibria is the set of
fd¤
1(µ1);d ¤
1(µ 2);d ¤
2(µ 1);d ¤
2(µ 2)gthat satisfy the following incentive compatible
constraints:
UA(µ1;d ¤
1(µ 1);d ¤
2(µ 1)) ¸ UA(µ1;d ¤
1(µ 2);d ¤
2(µ 2)) (IC1)
UA(µ2;d ¤
1(µ 2);d ¤
2(µ 2)) ¸ UA(µ2;d ¤
1(µ 1);d ¤
2(µ 1)) (IC2)
In a separating equilibrium, believes are: ¹(µ1jd¤
1(µ1) )=1 ;¹(µ 1jd ¤
1(µ 2)) =
0. With these believes we can compute d¤
2(µ):
d¤
2(µ)=¯ 2+µ (9)
Using (xx) and the de¯nition of UA, the constraint IC1 and IC2 become:
(®1 + µ1)(d¤
1(µ1) ¡ d¤
1(µ2)) +
1
2
(d¤
1(µ2)2 ¡ d¤
1(µ1)2) ¸ ¢µ(®2 ¡ ¯2 ¡
¢µ
2
)
IC01 (10)
(®1 + µ2)(d¤
1(µ2) ¡ d¤
1(µ1)) +
1
2
(d¤
1(µ1)2 ¡ d¤
1(µ2)2) ¸ ¢µ(¯2 ¡ ®2 ¡
¢µ
2
)
IC02 (11)
To characterize the separating equilibrium, we have to identify the rele-
vant incentive constraint. The RHS of IC0i represents the bene¯ts for type
µi of mimicking the type µj; i;j =1 ;2. We identify 3 cases: case S.1: the
RHS of IC01 is positive (®2 ¡ ¯2 ¡ ¢µ
2 ¸ 0), in this case, the utility of µ1
increases if he acts as µ2. Case S.2: The RHS of IC02 is positive, in this case,
the utility of µ2 increases if he acts as µ1. Case S.3: Both RHS are negative
which means that no type has an incentive to misrepresent his type11.
Case S.1: Suppose that ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¡ ¢µ
2 ¸ 0: The set of separating equi-
librium is:
d¤
1(µ1)=® 1 + µ 1 (12)
d¤
1(µ2) 2 D ´f d 1( µ 2) j IC01;IR 1g
11It is impossible to have the two incentive contraint relevant at the same time. This
comes from the single crossing property of the utility function.
11The set D is the set of decisions that satisfy the participation constraint
for type µ2 and the constraint IC01. Using (xx), and the de¯nition of the
utility function, D ´ D1\D2. D1 is the set of incentive compatible decisions:
D1 ´]0;® 1+µ 1¡
p
K 1][[® 1+µ 1+
p
K 1;+1[:and D2 is the set of decisions
that left a positive utility to agent µ2: D2 ´ [®1 +µ2 ¡
p
K3;® 1+µ 2+
p
K 3]
where K3 =( ® 1+µ 2) 2¡¯ 2
2+
® 2¯ 2
2 ¡µ 2
2:
This equilibrium is supported by pessimistic believes: ¹(µ1jd1)=1 ;8 d 16 =
d ¤
1( µ 2)a n d¹ ( µ 1j d 1)=0 ;if d 1 =d ¤
1(µ 2):
Now we us the intuitive criterion to eliminate all the equilibria but the
LCS one.
An equilibrium is not intuitive if:
9d1(µ2) 2 Ds:t:UA(µ2;d 1(µ 2)) >U A( µ 2;d ¤
1(µ 2)) (13)
The idea behind this condition is if the principal observes a deviation
from the equilibrium decision d¤
1(µ2) to an other incentive compatible deci-
sion d1(µ2) 2 D, it can be done only by the type µ2: Observing such an
out-of-equilibrium action, the principal has to update her believes about µ
to: ¹(µ1jd1(µ2) )=0 :
It is easy to show that such the only surviving equilibrium is: d¤
1(µ2)=
® 1+µ 2if ®2¡¯2 ¸ ¢µ and d¤
1(µ2)=® 1+µ 1+
p
K 1=® 1+µ 2+(
p
K1¡¢µ)
otherwise. The ¯rst corresponds to the case where ®1 + µ2 2 D12: In the
second case, d¤
1(µ2) is the decision closest to ®1 + µ2 within D:
Case S.2 and S.3 are similar to this case.
(ii) Pooling equilibria
A pooling equilibrium is de¯ned as: d¤
1(µ1)=d ¤
1=d ¤
1( µ 2) ;d ¤
2=Eµ+¯2;
¹(µ1jd1)=v 1 : To de¯ne the set of pooling equilibria, we have to de¯ne
out-of-equilibrium believes that support the equilibrium. First, we have to
identify which type of agent wants to quit the pooling equilibrium. An agent
prefers to quit the pooling equilibrium, if his utility is greater if he can signal
his type. Again, we distinguish three cases: Case P.1: (®2 ¡ ¯2) ¸ v2¢µ
2
this case corresponds to the case where µ2 prefers d2(µ2)=¯ 2+µ 2rather
than d2(µ)=Eµ + ¯2. The agent µ2 has in this case an interest to signal
his type. Case P.2: (¯2 ¡ ®2) ¸ v1¢µ
2 This is the opposite case where the
utility of agent µ1 decreases if he cannot signal his type. Case P.3: Both
types prefer if they can signal their type13.
12Notice that ®1 + µ2 2 D if the costs of mimicking µ2 for µ1 (which are the lost utility
when µ1 chooses d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 2instead of d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 2) are greater than the bene¯ts
given by the RHS of IC
0
1: These costs of mimicking are
¢µ2
2 ; and they are greater than
bene¯ts if ®2 ¡ ¯2 · ¢µ:
13This is a consequence of the single crossing condition.
12Case P.1: In this case, as µ2wants to signal his type, the pooling equi-
librium d¤
1;d ¤
2 =Eµ +¯2 is supported by believes: ¹(µ1jd1)=1i fd 16 =d ¤
1
and ¹(µ1jd1)=v 1if d1 = d¤
1 To be an equilibrium, d¤
1;d ¤
2 must satisfy the
following individual rationality constraints UA(µi;d ¤
1;d ¤
2) ¸ 0;i =1 ; 2 :We
call DIR the set ofd¤
1 for which individual rationality is satis¯ed. Moreover,
the two following equilibrium requirement must be satis¯ed:
UA(µ1;d ¤
1;d ¤
2)¸UA(µ 1;d 1;d 2 =µ 1+¯ 2)8d 1 6=d ¤
1 (14)
UA(µ2;d ¤
1;d ¤
2)¸UA(µ 2;d 1;d 2 =µ 1+¯ 2)8d 1 6=d ¤
1
Using these two conditions, we can de¯ne the set D of pooling equilibria.
The condition xx is satis¯ed for all d1 if it is satis¯ed for d1 = ®1 + µ1.
Condition xx resumes to: d¤
1 2 D1 ´ [®1 + µ1 ¡
p
A;®1 + µ1 +
p
A]; where
A =2 v 2¢ µ ( ® 2¡¯ 2¡¢ µ ) : Condition xx is satis¯ed for all d1 if it is satis¯ed
for d1 = ®1 + µ2 xx becomes: d¤
1 2 D2 ´ [®1 + µ2 ¡
p
B;®1 +µ2 +
p
B];
where B =2 v 2 ¢ µ ( ® 2¡¯ 2 )+( 1¡v 2
1)¢µ: The set of pooling equilibria is
de¯ned as: d¤
1 2 D ´ D1 \ D2 \ DIR:
Suppose that set is non empty, we use the intuitive criterion to suppress
all the pooling equilibria.
add some stu® here
The cases P.2 and P.3 are similar. To eliminate hybrid equilibria, we
proceed as in the case of pooling equilibria. q.e.d
Proposition 1 establishes that delegating d1 suppress the asymmetric
information between the principal and the agent. In the next section, we
show that such a delegation has bene¯ts as well as costs and that even if it
reduces the information asymmetry it is not always optimal to delegate.
3.3 Complete delegation and second period delegation
Finally, we mention the two other possible allocations of decision rights: the
complete delegation and the second period delegation. These cases have in
common that there is no problem of information transmission from the agent
to the principal. Under complete delegation, the agent takes his preferred
decisions d1 and d2:
d1 = ®1 + µ (15)
d2 = ®2 + µ (16)
The complete delegation of decision rights to the agent raises a problem
of time consistency: after observing d1, the principal has an incentive to
13retake from the agent the control right over d2. Indeed, after observing d1,
the principal learns the state of the world µ. Delegating the second period
decision has no bene¯t but just a cost14. Therefore, if the principal cannot
commit to the allocation of decision right over d2 to the agent15, he will
anticipate that the allocation of decision will be changed. If there is no
commitment to the allocation of the second decision, the case of complete
delegation is identical to the case of delegation16.
If the principal delegates only d2, she takes d1 according to (1) and the
agent takes d2 according to (10). In this case, only the second decision is
taken by an informed party. Second period delegation is equivalent to a one
period model where information transmission plays no role.
4 Costs and bene¯ts of delegation
When the principal delegates some decision to the agent, she su®ers a loss of
control because the agent doesn't have the same preferences over decisions.
But, on the other hand, the agent is better informed about the state of the
world and delegated decisions are token on the base of a better information.
Moreover, when the principal delegates d1, there is a transfer of information
from the agent to the principal (proposition 1). Delegation has a bene¯t
as well as a cost. The bene¯ts are linked to the information, the cost to
the divergence of interests. We call the latter costs of delegation and the
former bene¯ts of information. In this section, we provide a convenient
way to isolate costs and bene¯ts associated with delegation. Using these
de¯nitions, it is easy to identify the optimal organization.
4.1 Bene¯ts of delegation (bene¯ts of information)
What are the bene¯ts of delegation? What kind of advantages can the
principal have when she delegates some decisions to the agent? Obviously,
14Except if the interests over d2 are perfectly congruent.
15Aghion and Tirole (1997) study this particular problem of commitment to a given
organizational structure. They study how the principal can credibly commit not to infer
too much in agent's decision in order to stimulate his initiative. They distinguish formal
and real authority: which are right to decide versus e®ective control over decisions. A
credible way for the principal to not interfer in agent's decisions is to give formal authority
to the agent. But, even in the case where the principal keeps formal autorithy, the
principal can stimulate the initiative of the agent by using costly monitoring technology
or by monitoring a large number of agents and be in a situation of overload.
16For the remaining of the paper, when we speak about complete delegation, we assume
that the principal can commit to a given allocation of decision rights.
14these advantages come from the informational structure of the model. As
the agent has superior information, under delegation, decisions are based
on the actual value of µ rather than on its prior distribution. Therefore,
the bene¯ts of delegation are the bene¯ts of having an informed decider.
The bene¯ts of information can be easily computed by taking the di®erence
between the expected utility of an informed principal and the expected
utility of an uninformed principal. In both cases, we suppose that the
principal takes both decisions. When she is informed, di = ¯i + µ; i =1 ;2,
when she's not, di = ¯i+v1µ1+v2µ2; i =1 ;2. The bene¯ts of delegation are
the di®erence EUP(Principal informed)¡EUP(Centralization) = v1v2¢µ2.
Being informed increases EUP by v1v2¢µ2. We can decompose this bene¯ts
in two parts: the bene¯ts of an informed decision d1 and the bene¯ts of an
informed decision d2. By symmetry of the model, the per decision bene¯ts of
information is equal to: v1v2¢µ2
2 . The following lemma follows immediately:
Lemma 1 The bene¯ts of information are equal to:
v1v2¢µ2
when the principal delegates d1 or d1 and d2.
They are equal to:
v1v2¢µ2
2
when the principal delegates d2.
When the principal delegates d1, both decisions are taken on the basis
of the true value of µ17 because the ¯rst decision signals µ to the principal
and she becomes informed before choosing d2 as established in proposition
1. While under delegation of d2 only, the ¯rst decision is not taken under
complete information but only on the base of priors. These bene¯ts are half
of what they are under complete or ¯rst period delegation.
The positive bene¯ts of information re°ects the quadratic nature of the
cost function used in the model. These bene¯ts are a quadratic function of
¢µ. When ¢µ is large, agent's information has a great value.
4.2 Costs of delegation (loss of control)
To compute the bene¯ts of delegation, we have abstract from the loss of
control associated with diverging interests between the principal and the
17This is, by de¯nition, also the case under complete delegation
15agent. Now, similarly, to compute the costs of delegation we abstract from
the asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent and con-
centrate only on the problem of diverging interests. The costs of delegation
or loss of control are related to the fact that the agent doesn't share the
principal's preferences over decisions. So these costs are function of the
divergence of interest between the principal and the agent. To measure
them, we compare the principal's expected utility in two situations: in the
¯rst, the principal is informed and take all the decisions, in the second,
she's informed and delegates one or two decisions to the agent. CDi =
EUP(Principal informed) ¡ EUP(Delegation of di): By doing so, we ab-
stract from informational gains that can be produced by delegation
Lemma 2 The costs of ¯rst period delegation (CD1) are:
If ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2j ,
CD1 =
(®1 ¡¯1)2
2
(17)
If ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ,
CD1 =
(®1 ¡¯1)2
2
+v2(
p
K1 ¡¢µ)(®1 ¡ ¯1 +
p
K1 ¡ ¢µ
2
) (18)
If ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ,
CD1 =
(®1 ¡¯1)2
2
+v1(
p
K2 ¡¢µ)(¯1 ¡ ®1 +
p
K2 ¡ ¢µ
2
) (19)
The costs of second period delegation (CD2) are given by:
CD2 =
(®2 ¡¯2)2
2
(20)
The costs of complete delegation (CD12) are given by:
CD12 =
(®1 ¡ ¯1)2
2
+
(®2 ¡ ¯2)2
2
(21)
The lemma shows that the costs of delegation are an increasing function
of the distance between the principal's and agent's ideal decision. CD2 is
a function of the distance between ®2 and ¯2;C D 12 is a function of the
distance between ®1 and ¯1 and ®2 and ¯2. Under ¯rst period delegation,
CD1 can take three values depending on the signalling equilibrium described
in our ¯rst corollary. In the case of free lunch signals, the costs of delegation
are simply a function of the distance between ®1 and ¯1. The greater the
16distance between the principal's and the agent's ideal point, the greater CD1
is. An interesting question is to see if the costs of delegation are reduced or
increased when the signals are costly for the agent. This depends on (i) the
direction and (ii) the size of the change in the decision relative to the case
of free lunch signals. Take the case where the agent sends a costly signal in
state µ2
18: it implies that d1(µ2)=® 1+µ 2+
p
K 1¡¢ µ>® 1+µ 2 . This
increases in d1(µ2) bene¯ts to the principal if (i) ¯1 >® 1which means that
the principal's ideal point is greater than those of the agent and (ii) the
increase in d1(µ2) is not too big relative to ¯1 ¡ ®1: when the agent takes
d1(µ2)=® 1+µ 2 , the distance between the principal's ideal point and the
actual decision is (¯1 ¡®1). The utility of the principal will be increased in
state µ2 if the distance between the decision d1(µ2)=® 1+µ 2+
p
K 1¡¢ µ
and her ideal point ¯1 + µ2 is smaller than (¯1 ¡ ®1). Because of the single
peakness assumption, the maximal increase
p
K1 ¡ ¢µ that left a positive
utility gain to the principal is twice the distance ¯1 ¡ ®1. The ¯gure 2
summarizes the argument presented here.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
>From the previous discussion, we can establish the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2 (i) When ¢µ is small (¢µ ·j ® 2¡¯ 2 j ;the costs of ¯rst
period delegation are reduced if:
When ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ; (i) ¯1 >® 1and (ii) 2(¯1 ¡ ®1) > (
p
K1 ¡ ¢µ)
When ¯2 ¡ ®2 ¸ ¢µ, (i) ®1 >¯ 1and (ii) 2(®1 ¡ ¯1) > (
p
K2 ¡ ¢µ)
(ii) When ®1 = ®2 and ¯1 = ¯2, the costs of delegation always increase.
This proposition establishes that not only the distance between the prin-
cipal's and agents ideal points matters but also the direction of preferences.
We will see that the costly signals creates an asymmetry in the choice of the
organizational structure. For a given j®1 ¡ ¯1j, the choice will di®er in the
case ®1 ¸ ¯1 from the case ¯1 ¸ ®1.
4.3 Optimal organizational structure
>From the computation of costs and bene¯ts of delegation, comparisons
between the four organizational structure are easy. Using lemma 1 and 2,
the next proposition is immediate:
18This corresponds to the case where ®2 ¡ ¯2 ¸ ¢µ
17Proposition 3 The optimal organizational structure is the organization for
which the di®erence between the associated costs and bene¯ts is maximal with
the costs and bene¯ts of centralization both equal to zero.
The following technical lemmas give the optimal organizational struc-
ture. Our results are summarized in propositions xx, xx and xx as well as
in ¯gure3.
Lemma 3 The optimal organization is:
to delegate d1 if:
CD1 · v1v2¢µ2 (22)
and if CD2 · v1v2¢µ2
2 :
(®1 ¡¯1)2
2
¡
(®2 ¡¯2)2
2
·
v1v2¢µ2
2
(23)
to delegate d2 if:
CD2 ·
v1v2¢µ2
2
(24)
or
(®1 ¡ ¯1)2
2
¡
(®2 ¡ ¯2)2
2
¸
v1v2¢µ2
2
(25)
and centralization otherwise.
Proof. We ¯rst show that complete delegation is always dominated: when
¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2 j ,CD1 =
(®1¡¯1)2
2 is always smaller than CD12. Therefore
if complete delegation dominates centralization (CD12 · v1v2¢µ2); com-
plete delegation is dominated by ¯rst period delegation (by proposition xx).
When ¢µ ·j ® 2¡¯ 2j , it implies ¢µ2 · (®2¡¯2)2: Then
(®1¡¯1)2
2 +
(®2¡¯2)2
2
cannot be smaller than v1v2¢µ2, which means that centralization dominates
complete delegation.
First period delegation dominates when CD1 ¸ v1v2¢µ2; and if second
period delegation dominates centralization, CD1¡v1v2¢µ2 must be greater
than CD2 ¡ v1v2¢µ2
2 . If this last expression is positive, it implies ¢µ ¸
j®2¡¯2j a n dw eh a v eCD1 =
(®1¡¯1)2
2 . Equation 21 is simply a reformulation
of these conditions.
Second period delegation dominates if CD2 · v1v2¢µ2
2 (equation 22) and
if v1v2¢µ2
2 ¡ CD2 ¸ v1v2¢µ2 ¡CD1 (equation 23). q.e.d
18Proposition 4 For large ¢µ, some form of delegation is optimal. If j®1 ¡
¯1j is large compared to j®2 ¡¯2j, the principal delegates d2 only, otherwise
she delegates d1:
When ¢µ is large, the agent's information has a great value. It is impor-
tant for the principal to have informed decisions which imply that delegation
is optimal. She delegates d2 in the case where the costs of delegating d1 is
large relative to the costs of delegating d2: Notice also that when ¢µ is
large, the agent's can transfer their information at no cost.
Proposition 5 For small ¢µ, the optimal organizational structure is either
to delegate d1 or centralization. The choice depends on (i) the distance
between ®1 and ¯1 and (ii) the sign of the di®erence (®1 ¡ ¯1).
When ¢µ is small, it is more di±cult for the agent to transfer his in-
formation to the principal. This di±culty leads to more extreme decisions
than in the case of a high ¢µ. More extreme decisions bene¯ts to the prin-
cipal only if, an informed principal would have been more extreme than the
agent. This explains why when for a given j®1 ¡ ¯1j, when the interests go
in the same direction, the principal delegates more often and when they go
in opposite direction, she delegates less.
Proposition 6 When ®1 = ®2 and ¯1 = ¯2, the optimal organizational
structure is delegation if CD1 · v1v2¢µ2 and centralization otherwise.
If both decisions have the same importance, when the principal delegates,
she delegates d1:
The following ¯gure (INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE) represents optimal
organizational structure(centralization vs delegation) for the case of ®2 >¯ 2.
As we can see, an increase in ¢µ a®ects the organizational structure in a
twofold way: ¯rst it increases the bene¯ts of information (favors delegation)
and second, it a®ects the agent's decision. A high ¢µ favors free lunch
signals instead of costly signals, and this in turn a®ect the organizational
choice.
5 Cheap talks
Without modifying the assumptions on contract, we can identify circum-
stances under which the principal never delegates and still achieve infor-
mation revelation. A situation where the principal enjoys the bene¯ts of
19information without incurring any costs of delegation. This will be the case
if, when the principal retains decision rights over d1 and d2, the agent com-
municates freely and truthfully the state of the world to the principal19.W e
call this case cheap talks. If the principal is informed by the agent, she takes
the decisions d1 and d2 that corresponds to her ideal point ¯i + µ;i =1 ;2.
The agents communicate the relevant information to the principal if the
following sets of conditions are satis¯ed: the ¯rst set of conditions (equa-
tions 15 and 16) ensures that the agent prefers an informed principal to
centralization. The second set (equation 19 and 20) ensures that the agent
communicates a di®erent information in state µ1 than in state µ2.
UA(µ1;d i =¯ i+µ 1;i=1 ;2) ¸ UA(µ1;d i =¯ i+v 1µ 1+v 2µ 2;i=1 ;2) (26)
UA(µ2;d i =¯ i+µ 2;i=1 ;2) ¸ UA(µ2;d i =¯ i+v 1µ 1+v 2µ 2;i=1 ;2) (27)
If these conditions are both satis¯ed, the agent always prefers an in-
formed principal to centralization. If one of these conditions doesn't hold,
both agents will send the same message and the principal won't learn the
state of the world (unless she delegates). Using the de¯nition of UA, (15)
and (16) can be rewritten as:
®1 + ®2 ¡ ¯1 ¡ ¯2 · v2¢µ (28)
¯1 + ¯2 ¡ ®1 ¡ ®2 · v1¢µ (29)
And it is clear that at least one of these conditions is trivially satis¯ed.
The agent communicates a di®erent message in state µ1 than in state µ2
if the following conditions are both satis¯ed (or both unsatis¯ed):
UA(µ1;d i =¯ i+µ 1;i=1 ;2) ¸ UA(µ1;d i =¯ i+µ 2;i=1 ;2) (30)
UA(µ2;d i =¯ i+µ 2;i=1 ;2) ¸ UA(µ2;d i =¯ i+µ 1;i=1 ;2) (31)
Using the de¯nition of UA,w eh a v e :
® 1+® 2¡¯ 1¡¯ 2·¢ µ (32)
¯1 + ¯2 ¡ ®1 ¡ ®2 · ¢µ (33)
These conditions are weaker than the conditions (17) and (18). The agent
communicates µ to the principal only if he prefers an informed principal to
centralization.
19Or any pair of messages m(µ1);m(µ 2) from which the principal can infer the state of
the world.
20Proposition 7 If ®1 +®2 ¡¯1 ¡¯2 · v2¢µ and ¯1 +¯2 ¡®1 ¡®2 · v1¢µ,
the optimal organization is centralization and the agent communicates his
private information to the principal.
This proposition describes the case in which retaining the information
hurts the agent. From this discussion, it appears that communication is
an important factor in the choice of an organizational form. The following
¯gure (INSERT FIGURE HERE) shows when cheap talks and centralization
dominates delegation.
6 Rules
When the principal left some power to the agent, she would like to reduce
the discretion of the agent by imposing some constraints on the choice of
the subordinate agent. Constraining the choice of the agent appears to
be a useful way to reduce the cost of delegation while preserving what we
called the bene¯ts of information. To reduce the discretion of the agent,
the principal may constraint the agent to choose d1 within a given subset L.
By doing so, we will say that the principal imposes a rule that limits the
discretion of the agent in the choice of d1. We de¯ne a rule as a compulsory
requirement that must be followed when the principal delegates the decision
rights over d1: Our interest in this subsection is to see how the principal
can e®ectively reduces the cost of delegation by imposing such a rule and
to compute the optimal way of doing so, what we call the optimal rule.
The emergence of rule that lower the power of incentives is a fundamental
characteristic of any organization (see for example Martimort (199x)). Here
by contrast, we describes rules that keep the delegated decision informative.
In that sense, our work is to ¯nd how to reduce the agent's discretion and
preserve the incentives to signal the information through his decision. Our
work is related to Armstrong (1994)20.
If we turn back to our examples of the introduction, a rule can be: in the
case of political decision, a restrictions on the set of possible decision such
as those who respect a budget constraint or those who favors employment,..
In vertical relations, a rule is for example a technical description of the
component or a limited budget paid by the client to the supplier for R&D.
Constraining the choice of the agent may be done in a variety of ways.
We will restrict our attention to rules that are formed of a connected subset
of possible decisions d1.
20Armstrong's main results is to show that the discretion of the agent is reduced when
there is a greater risk of (the agent and the principal) having diverging interest.
21Assumption 1 A rule is a connected subset L of the possible decisions d1.
Choosing a rule for the principal is to choose the boundaries l and l of
the subset L =
h
l;l
i
.
To do the analysis, we have to assume that the principal can enforce the
rule. i.e. She can e®ectively constraint the choice of the agent21. Another
important assumption, that follows directly from our contractual restric-
tions, is that the rule cannot be state contingent. In other words, the subset
L is independent of µ.
The optimal rule depends on how the agent acts when he receives control
right over d1. To compute it, we distinguish two cases: the case of costless
signals where both incentive constraints are slack and the agent implements
his preferred decision in both states of the world22 and the case where one
incentive constraint binds (case of costly signals).
6.1 Rule in the case of free lunch signals
The following lemma reduces the set of possible rules:
Lemma 4 Without loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to rules
of the form [0;l],w i t h® 1+µ 1·l·® 1+µ 2 , when ¯1 is smaller than ®1.
While when ¯1 >® 1, we can consider, wlog, only rules of the form [l;+1[
with ®1 + µ2 ¸ l ¸ ®1 + µ1.
Proof: Appendix
As it appears from lemma xx, the rules takes a di®erent form if ®1 is
greater or smaller than ¯1. this corresponds to the case where the agent takes
a greater/ smaller decision than an informed principal would have taken.
The reaction of the principal di®ers in the two situations: in one case, it is
important to decrease the agent's decision, in the other case, it is important
to increase it. In the paper, we treat the case in which the principal wants
to decreases the decision of the agent (case where ®1 >¯ 1). The other case
is symmetric and can be easily be computed with our analysis.
Reaction of the agent to the rule. The following proposition de-
scribes the decisions of the agent when the principal imposes a rule of the
type described in lemma xx:
21But the agent has still the possibility of quitting the organization.
22This correspond to the case where ¢µ ¸j ® 2¡¯ 2j .
22Proposition 8 When the rule is [0;l]; the decisions of the agent in state
µ1and µ2 are given by:
d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 1 if l ¸ ~ l (34)
d1(µ1)=® 1+µ 1¡
q
H( l ) if l · ~ l (35)
d1(µ2)=l (36)
Where ~ l = ®1 + µ2 ¡
p
2
p
¢µ
p
®2 ¡ ¯2 +¢ µand H(l)=( ® 1¡l ) 2¡2 lµ2 +
2(®2µ1 + ¯2¢µ + ®1µ2 + ¯2µ2 + µ2µ1) ¡ µ2
1 And H(l) is a monotone and
increasing function with H(~ l)=0 .
proof: appendix
In state µ2, the agent selects the decision that is closest to his ideal point
within the allowed subset. This decision is the upper bound of the subset
L. In state µ1, the agent selects the decision gives him the highest utility
and such that IC01 is satis¯ed. This decision is either ®1 + µ1or given by
the constraint.
The value ~ l is the smallest value of l that keeps the decisions d1(µ1)=
® 1+µ 1 ;d 1(µ 2)=lincentive compatible23.
This value ~ l is derived from (IC0
1). When l<~ l , if the agent wants to
reveal his information in state µ1;his decision is not is preferred one.
limits to the imposition of rules (I): participation constraints As
the rule push down the decision of the agent in at least one state of the world,
we have to check that the constrained decision leaves a positive utility to
the agent in both states of the world µ1 and µ2. The agent's participation
constraint limits the possibilities of restricting the agent's discretion.
Lemma 5 The agent stays in the organization in both states of the world
if the rule l is such that:
H(l) · (®1 + µ1)2 +2 ® 2( ¯ 2+µ 1)¡¯ 2
2¡µ 2
1 (37)
l ¸ ®1 + µ2 ¡
q
(®1 + µ2)2 +2 ® 2( ¯ 2+µ 2)¡¯ 2
2¡µ 2
2 (38)
proof: appendix
As we said in the introduction, by paying an unconditional wage W, the
principal increases UA and can solve the participation problem24. If the
23Actually, it is the only intuitive separating equilibrium.
24At least when the organization is ex ante socially e±cient: EU
P +U
A ¸ 0:
23principal pays an additional wage to the agent, the participation constraint
are modi¯ed:
H(l) · (®1 + µ1)2 +2 ® 2( ¯ 2+µ 1)¡¯ 2
2¡µ 2
1+W (39)
l ¸ ®1 + µ2 ¡
q
(®1 + µ2)2 +2 ® 2( ¯ 2+µ 2)¡¯ 2
2¡µ 2
2+W (40)
We call ¹ lIR1 and ¹ lIR2 the highest values of ¹ l such that (xx) and (xx) are
satis¯ed.
limits to the imposition of rules (II): incentive constraint The
second limit to the imposition of rules is the preservation of information
transmission by the agent. As it can be seen from the demonstration of
proposition xx, we didn't use the second incentive compatible constraint
IC0
2. If this constraint isn't satis¯ed, it is impossible to have decisions that
signals the state of the world to the principal. The rule must be set a at
level that guarantee that IC0
2 is satis¯ed.
Lemma 6 The rule preserves information transmission if l is such that:
(®1+µ2)(l¡(®1+µ1¡
q
H(l)))+
1
2
((®1+µ1¡
q
H(l))2¡l
2) ¸ ¢µ(¯2¡®2¡
¢µ
2
)
(41)
with H(l)=0if l ¸ ~ l:
We call l
IC0
2 the highest value of l such that IC02 is satis¯ed.
The optimal rule We can now compute the optimal rule that preserves
agent's participation and information transmission. We identify the optimal
rule with its upper bound l¤. The optimal rule can have three possible
forms:
RULE A: chooses l¤ = ¯1 + µ2 ¸ ~ l:
With rule A, the agent selects the principal's optimal decision in state
µ2 and ®1 + µ1 in µ1. With this rule, the cost of delegation is v1
(®1¡¯1)2
2 .
RULE B: choose l¤ · ~ l such that:
v1
·
¯1 ¡ ®1 ¡ ¢µ +
q
H(l¤)
¸
H0(l¤)
2
q
H(l¤)
= ¡v2(¯1 + µ2 ¡ l¤) (42)
In this case, the rule is such that the principal maximizes her expected
utility for l¤, taking into account the fact that the agent reacts to the rule
according to proposition 9.
24RULE C: Choose l¤ = Max[®1+µ1;l
IC0
2;¹ lIR1;¹ lIR2].
With this rule, the principal selects the highest possible rule that pre-
serves participation and information transmission.
Proposition 9 The optimal rule is such l¤ that:
² If ~ l ¸ ¯1+µ2 use rule B if l¤ ¸ Max[®1+µ1;l
IC0
2;¹ lIR1;¹ lIR2] otherwise
use rule C.
² If ~ l · ¯1 + µ2 use rule A if ¯1 + µ2 ¸ Max[®1 +µ1;l
IC0
2;¹ lIR1;¹ lIR2]
and rule A gives a greater utility than rule B, otherwise do as in the
previous case.
The existence of two possible rule in the case ~ l · ¯1 +µ2 is explained by
the fact that the pro¯t is not monotone on
h
~ l;¯1 + µ2
i
:
In any cases, restricting the discretion of the agent decreases the costs
of delegation.
Corrolary 2 Even if the principal can reduce agent's discretion, the costs
of delegation are positive.
Add some stu® here
7 Conclusion
The main message of this paper is to show that when contracts µ a la Baron
Myerson are prohibited, the principal can still extract information from the
agent, either by using message games or by delegating the choice of the ¯rst
project to the agent. Using the properties of signalling games, we have
shown that delegation is an alternative to contracting. If delegation has
the advantage of extracting agent's information, it has also some costs (loss
of control). So we have shown that the principal will not always use this
delegation-revelation mechanism, especially if the agent's information has
little value (¢µ is small) or if the divergence of interest (j®1 ¡ ¯1j) is large.
The main di®erence between the standard contracting technics and the
model developed in this paper is that the principal cannot control the rents
she pays to the agent. In the complete contract framework, rents are func-
tion of the agent's report of his private information and the principal can
elicit information by paying higher rents to e±cient agents. In our incom-
plete contract framework, the rents paid by the principal are unconditional
25on the type. The rents received by the agent is the utility he has when he
is in charge of the ¯rst decision. The unconditionality of the rents increases
the costs of information for the principal. We have shown that the principal
can reduce the costs of delegation (and therefore agent's rents) by reducing
his discretion but she cannot completely suppress these loss of control.
Pertinence of incomplete contract hypothesis: Even if our contracting
restrictions seems to be strong in our paper, we believe that the incom-
plete contract hypothesis is a useful tool to understand how decisions are
e®ectively taken within organizations.
day to day relations between managers and employee
extension to a continuum of decision.
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